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Abstract
Objectives General Strain Theory (Agnew in Criminology 30:47–87, 1992) has received
broad empirical support, but little is known about moderators of the strain-delinquency
relationship. This study tests whether self-control attenuates the relationship between a
certain type of delinquency—violence—and its most important precursor, considered a
type of strain: interpersonal provocation. This study compares the conditioning effects of
risk-affinity and self-control/impulsivity on the provocation-violence link, since recent
work suggests differentiating between both characteristics.
Methods The provocation-violence link is examined (1) using a scenario design with
randomly varied degrees of objective provocation and a measure of projected violence, and
(2) with measures of self-reported past violence and subjective sensitivity to provocation.
The analyses are based on a large sample of seventh-graders (n = 2635) from five cities in
Western Germany, interviewed in 2013. Linear probability models regressing violence
measures on personal traits, provocation measures, and their interactions are estimated.
Results Both self-control and risk-affinity moderate the relationship between subjective
sensitivity to provocation and past violent behavior. Students with high self-control are
able to control their anger and do not turn violent, even when they feel provoked easily.
However, only risk-affinity significantly amplifies the effect of objective provocation on
prospective violence when simultaneously controlling for the conditioning effect of self-
control.
Conclusions Findings underscore that both self-control and risk-aversion are important
coping resources. This study highlights the importance of using internally consistent and
mechanism-congruent measures in the study of illicit coping processes and conditioning
factors and discourages from using composite, potentially multidimensional measures.
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Introduction
In recent decades, General Strain Theory (GST, Agnew 1985, 1992) has received solid
empirical support (e.g. Mazerolle and Piquero 1997; Mazerolle et al. 2000; Piquero and
Sealock 2000; Hay 2003; Broidy 2001) and has become one of the leading explanations of
crime and deviant behaviors. However, the problem of predicting when individuals will
tend towards a delinquent coping response and the question of which stressors are par-
ticularly conducive to crime and delinquency have motivated Agnew to make extensions to
the GST (Agnew 2001, 2006, 2013; Agnew et al. 2002). This concerns, amongst other
extensions, the introduction of the idea that specific strains are more strongly related to
corresponding types of crime, the differentiation between objective and subjective strain,
and the stronger focus on interpersonal differences in coping resources.
One factor that can be expected to condition the reaction to strain is low self-control
(Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990; Agnew 2006; DeWall et al. 2007; Denson et al. 2011b).
Faced with irritation and strain, individuals with high self-control should be more prone to
reflect on different action alternatives and to take into account the long-term costs of
delinquent coping. People with low self-control should instead act on impulse and ‘take the
easy way out’ of the unpleasant situation, which often results in crime and delinquency.
Previous studies, however, provided inconsistent results on the conditioning effect of low
self-control. Some studies were able to reveal an interaction effect between low self-
control and strain in the expected direction (e.g. Baron 2009; Hay and Meldrum 2010; Jang
and Rhodes 2012; Moon et al. 2012; Turanovic and Pratt 2013), while others were not (e.g.
Botchkovar et al. 2009; Stogner and Gibson 2010; Ellwanger and Pratt 2014).
Three factors may have contributed to this discrepancy in results. First, the use of
composite indices of strain, as well as composite indices of ‘general delinquency’, should
hamper the discovery of conditioning effects if the strains that are included in composite
indices differ in their predictive quality with regard to the delinquent behaviors under study
and/or the respective motives behind delinquent coping (Felson et al. 2012). Without
knowing the reason for delinquent coping (in other words, why individuals solve their
problems in a delinquent manner) it must likewise remain unclear which coping resource
would make delinquent coping less likely; thus the choice of factors expected to condition
the effects of strain on delinquency must become arbitrary. A similar problem pertains to
the applied measures of self-control: prior studies often used composite, multi-dimensional
measures of low self-control, which neglected potential mechanisms underlying its func-
tioning as a coping resource. The most prominent example of such a composite measure is
probably the self-control scale by Grasmick et al. (1993). Several studies have shown that
the subdimensions of the Grasmick scale differ in their predictive quality with regard to
deviant behaviors (Arneklev et al. 1993; Wood et al. 1993; Longshore et al. 1996; Piquero
and Rosay 1998; Delisi et al. 2003; Bornewasser et al. 2007; Conner et al. 2009; Ward
et al. 2014). It can therefore be expected that the subdimensions also differ with respect to
their importance as coping resources. Therefore, the use of composite self-control mea-
sures containing subdimensions only weakly related or unrelated to the conditioning
process might have masked existing relationships as well. Third, research on the
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moderators of the strain-delinquency relationship should profit from taking into account the
subjective evaluation of strain. If the experienced objective strain is not considered severe,
and if the individual does not experience an intense emotional reaction to strain, criminal
coping is unlikely in the first place (Froggio and Agnew 2007) and there should be no need
to exercise self-control.
The current study advances knowledge of whether self-control conditions the reaction to
strain by addressing these three problems simultaneously. It considers a specific type of
strain that is particularly conducive to violence (interpersonal esteem-threatening provo-
cation), and matches it with the coping resource that is likely to be involved in not
responding violently to this type of strain: self-control. Recent work suggests differenti-
ating between the personality traits of risk-affinity and low self-control/impulsivity (Burt
and Simons 2013; Burt et al. 2014; Ksinan et al. 2014; Schulz 2014; Felson and Osgood
2008), which were combined in such self-control measures as the Grasmick scale. Building
on this line of work, this study contrasts the conditioning effect of low self-control/
impulsivity with that of risk-affinity. The link between provocation and violence is studied
with subjective and objective measures of provocation. The analyses are structured in two
parts: First, the link between provocation and violence is analyzed with a measure of
subjective sensitivity to provocation and self-reports of past violent behavior. Second,
projected violence within a presented vignette is analyzed as a function of experimentally
varied degrees of objective provocation. Data for this study come from a survey of seventh-
graders interviewed in the classroom context. The following sections provide an overview
of GST and outline why self-control should condition the relationship between provocation
and violence.
General Strain Theory and the Provocation-Violence Link
GST states that people engage in violence and other types of crime in order to cope with
their negative emotions, such as anger, frustration, and depression, caused by experiencing
strain or stressors (Agnew 1992, 2006). Strain refers to events, conditions, or types of
relationships that are disliked by individuals: ‘‘relationships in which others are not treating
the individual as he or she would like to be treated’’ (Agnew 1992, p. 50). The negative
emotions aroused by experiencing strain create pressure for corrective action. Crime is a
possible coping response, because it might be useful to reduce or escape from strains, seek
revenge against the source of strains, and/or alleviate negative emotions (e.g., through drug
use). While GST has received solid empirical support in general (e.g. Mazerolle and
Piquero 1997; Mazerolle et al. 2000; Piquero and Sealock 2000; Hay 2003; Broidy 2001),
the problems of predicting which individuals are particularly likely to react to strain with
delinquency and why some people remain resilient, even when experiencing considerable
strain, led Agnew to extend the GST in several respects (Agnew 2001, 2006, 2013; Agnew
et al. 2002). This includes, amongst other extensions, the introduction of the idea of
domain-specific effects of strain, the distinction between objective and subjective strain
and a stronger focus on possible coping resources.
In contrast to early theory formulations, in which Agnew (1992) posited a broad con-
nection between various types of strain and delinquent responses in general, Agnew has
now narrowed his perspective in more recent versions of the theory, and clarified which
strains are most likely to lead to criminal behavior (Agnew 2001). To the extent that
criminal coping is a corrective action, or provides a solution to a particular problematic
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situation, strain should have domain-specific effects and produce links between specific
strains and specific crimes, rather than a broad connection of stress to various types of
crimes. Therefore, ‘‘particular strains may be more conducive to some crimes than others
(e.g., victimization may be more conducive to violence than to income-generating crime)’’
(Agnew 2013, 665). As Felson et al. (2012, p. 350) have pointed out, Agnew has placed
greater emphasis on the phenomenon that crimes may serve as instrumental solutions to
problems created by particular stressors in more recent theory formulations (e.g., income-
generating crime as a solution to financial stress, counter-aggression as a way to retain a
‘tough’ reputation and avoid future victimization). Research has just begun to look into the
question of whether stress or strain have domain-specific effects on delinquency, but the
results so far support the notion that certain types of stress are more closely related to
corresponding types of crime (Felson et al. 2012). The results also support the idea that
strain has domain-specific effects, e.g., stress in the family is more closely connected to
delinquency in the family, and stress in school is closely connected to problem behavior in
school (De Coster and Kort-Butler 2006).
In more recent versions of GST, Agnew also differentiated between subjective and
objective strains. Objective strains refer to events or conditions which are ‘‘disliked by
most members of a given group’’ (Agnew 2001, p. 320). Physical assault or the death of a
loved one may serve as examples of strains which are generally disliked. Agnew (2001,
p. 321) defined subjective strain as, ‘‘events or conditions that are disliked by the people
who are experiencing (or have experienced) them.’’ Subjective strain therefore refers to an
individual’s personal evaluation of an event or condition. People ‘‘are much more likely to
engage in crime when they experience strains perceived to be high in magnitude and,
frequently, unjust’’ (Agnew 2013, p. 663, emphasis in original). GST states ‘‘that sub-
jective strains should have a larger impact on crime than objective strains’’ (Agnew 2013,
p. 654), as the intensity of the emotional reaction to objective strain is closely linked to the
subjective evaluation of the strain.
With the introduction of the concept of subjective strain, Agnew (2001) acknowledged
that individuals differ with regard to their sensitivity to certain types of experiences. For
example, people who are committed to the code of the street or honor cultures (Anderson
2000; Nisbett and Cohen 1996) may judge seemingly harmless jokes or minor slights as
severe ‘‘challenges to one’s honor or reputation, threats to one’s core identity as a ‘man’
and acts that may expose one to ongoing victimization if ignored’’ (Agnew 2013, p. 664).
Since threats to one’s ‘manliness’ might be judged differently by, for example, members of
a street gang compared to people with a weak internalization of traditional gender roles,
differences in the judgment of such experiences (subjective strain) might result in different
rates of violence above and beyond variations in the experience of objective strain between
different groups (Agnew 2001, 322, 325–326).
While Agnew’s (2001) introduction of individual differences in the judgment of neg-
ative events and experiences allows for better predictions as to which individuals will tend
towards delinquent coping (i.e., those who judge the respective experience as severe), at
the same time it makes separating subjective strain from the associated emotional response
problematic. While conceptually the emotional reaction to subjective strain should be a
distinct entity from the (cognitive) evaluation of the event or experience in question, in
reality, the emotional reaction to strain (i.e., how an individual ‘feels’ about the event) is
closely tied to its cognitive evaluation. Several experimental results on preferences, atti-
tudes and impression formation show that affective reactions can occur without extensive
perceptual and cognitive encoding. Instead, affective reactions to stimuli are often the very
first reactions of the organism and they are made with greater confidence than cognitive
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judgements (Zajonc 1980). Schwarz and Clore (1988) also demonstrated that, when
forming judgments, individuals often use a ‘How do I feel about it?’ heuristic and
incorporate their feelings towards an object into their evaluation. Agnew (2013, p. 656)
also stated that the ‘‘emotional reaction is primarily a function of the subjective evaluation
of the strain’’ and that ‘‘emotions may have feedback effects on the subjective evaluation of
the strain’’ (Agnew 2013, p. 656, emphasis added). However, while it may be difficult to
empirically disentangle subjective strain from its emotional ‘response’, it should at least be
possible to infer the subjective evaluation of a stressor from the amount of negative
emotions an event or experience induces.
Most research so far has exclusively relied on objective measures of strain, assuming
that those are also subjectively disliked by individuals (and remaining this assumption
untested). ‘‘(I)t is quite rare to ask about the perceived magnitude and injustice of the
strain’’ (Agnew 2013, p. 665). The few studies which directly compared the effects of
objective and subjective measures of strain yielded mixed results: while according to
Froggio and Agnew (2007), strains that are rated as more severe are more likely to be
associated with crime than those rated as less severe, Botchkovar et al. (2009) and Lin and
Mieczkowski (2011) did not replicate this finding.
Interpersonal provocation should be an especially interesting example of a specific type
of strain that is likely to evoke a particular type of delinquent behavior. At the same time,
the link between provocation and violence should be a phenomenon which profits from
taking individual differences in sensitivity to strain into account. Strains that involve a
personal attack, provocation or affront should be particularly likely to evoke aggressive
behavior and violence. ‘‘The main type of predicament that leads to coercion is a perceived
intentional attack by another person. When people believe that their identities have been
attacked, they often experience a loss of status and power, which is accompanied by
humiliation’’ (Tedeschi and Felson 1994, p. 256). Provocation by others has been found to
be one of the most important precursors of aggression and violence (Anderson and
Bushman 2002, p. 37; Agnew 2006, p. 30). When offenders are asked the reason for their
violent actions, having been provoked and having experienced a threat to one’s identity or
status are by far the most frequent explanations (Agnew 1990; Wilkinson 2002). Provo-
cations include, for example, ‘‘insults, slights, other forms of verbal aggression, physical
aggression, interference with one’s attempts to attain an important goal’’ (Anderson and
Bushman 2002, p. 37). Aggression or violence is often effective in restoring justice after
provocations or affronts, and in saving face by lowering the status of the provoking person
(Tedeschi and Felson 1994). The anger typically generated by interpersonal provocations
(Denson et al. 2011b) should also strongly predispose an individual toward aggressive and
violent reactions (Agnew 2006, 2013). Since individuals differ with respect to which
identities are salient and important to them (Stryker and Burke 2000), a threat to one’s
esteem, identity or status may consist of very diverse acts and should be strongly dependent
on an individual’s personal or group identity. While a provocation in an academic setting
may consist of a rude comment about one’s abilities or intelligence (DeWall et al. 2007;
Denson et al. 2011a), a provocation among street youths might involve maintaining eye
contact for too long or bumping into someone (Anderson 2000; Wilkinson 2002; Tertilt
1996). Therefore, the subjective evaluation of an event as a (severe) provocation (sub-
jective strain) can be expected to have more pronounced effects on violence and aggression
than an objective measure of provocation.
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Coping Resources in the Provocation-Violence Link: The Role of Self-
Control and Risk-Affinity
When experiencing an intentional affront or provocation, getting angry and having
aggressive impulses should be a ‘natural’ and spontaneous response. However, most
individuals do not turn their aggressive impulses into action most of the time. ‘‘(I)ndi-
viduals are typically motivated to regulate angry thoughts, feelings, and aggressive
behavior’’ (Denson et al. 2011b, p. 850) because, in the modern world, the display of anger
and engagement in aggressive behavior is associated with negative consequences. These
include ‘‘social disapproval, moral stigma, and legal difficulties’’ (Denson et al. 2011b,
p. 850). Refraining from turning aggressive impulses into action requires impulse control
and considering the possible negative consequences of one’s actions. Since not all people
are able to take into account the negative consequences of aggression, the failure to
regulate angry emotions and reacting aggressively to provocation can be regarded as a
failure of self-control (Denson et al. 2011b, p. 851; DeWall et al. 2007). Self-control
should accordingly be an important coping resource with respect to the provocation-
violence link. Psychological research demonstrates that anger regulation, rather than
reacting aggressively to provocation, needs and depletes one’s self-regulatory capacity
(Denson et al. 2011b; DeWall et al. 2007). Conversely, however, low self-control does not
seem to increase aggression per se: a depleted capacity for self-regulation increases
aggressive responses to an insulting provocation, but participants with such depleted
capacity would not behave aggressively in the absence of an esteem-threatening provo-
cation (DeWall et al. 2007), underlining the interplay of a situational stressor (provocation)
and low self-control in the evocation of aggression and violence.
In criminology, research routinely uses measures of self-control with subdimensions
that are unrelated to self-control’s underlying mechanism of being able to control one’s
impulses and to take into account delayed (negative) consequences of actions. The most
famous example is the self-control scale by Grasmick et al. (1993). This scale was
developed based on statements about the ‘elements of self-control’ in Gottfredson and
Hirschi’s (1990) prominent General Theory of Crime (GTC, also known as self-control
theory). However, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) used the term ‘self-control’ in order to
‘‘refer to a loose amalgam that seems to include all individual difference factors that might
be associated with crime’’ (Felson and Osgood 2008, p. 160–161). According to them,
individuals with low self-control can be characterized as ‘‘impulsive, insensitive, physical
(as opposed to mental), risk-taking, short-sighted, and nonverbal’’ (Gottfredson and Hirschi
1990, p. 90). Apart from being largely unrelated to the core underlying mechanism of self-
control, this list of characteristics corresponds with different personality traits of the five-
factor model of personality (FFM, see Digman 1990 for a review), which have been shown
to be uncorrelated. This casts doubts on the unidimensionality as well as the construct
validity of the Grasmick-scale or similar measures of self-control (Marcus 2004; Romero
et al. 2003; Hirschi 2004; Piquero 2008). Measures of low self-control such as the scale by
Grasmick et al. (1993) therefore remain highly controversial (Hirschi and Gottfredson
1993; Marcus 2003, 2004; Piquero 2008).1
1 It should be noted that Hirschi and Gottfredson are strongly opposed to self-control measures such as the
Grasmick-scale. Partly in response to the frequent application of the Grasmick-scale when testing propo-
sitions of the GTC, Hirschi (2004) admitted that incorporating statements about ‘the elements of self-
control’ in the GTC was a severe mistake and borne out of ‘‘a moment of madness’’ (Hirschi 2004, 541).
Also, both authors of self-control theory have repeatedly emphasized that low self-control is defined as the
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Self-control measures such as the scale by Grasmick et al. (1993) also combine
impulsivity and risk-affinity, although a growing body of research suggest that they refer to
different concepts and mechanisms, and that both are uniquely consequential for crime
(Ksinan et al. 2014; Burt et al. 2014; Burt and Simons 2013; Schulz 2014). According to
the dual-system model by Steinberg et al. (2008), impulsivity and risk-affinity belong to
different neurobiological subsystems with underpinnings in different brain regions: the
socio-emotional system is seen as responsible for reward-seeking behavior, such as seeking
out strong emotional experiences. Risk-affinity can be regarded as a subdimension of such
sensation-seeking (Zuckerman 2009). The cognitive control system is related to impulse
control and the capacity to reflect on the potential costs of decision-making. Steinberg et al.
(2008) point out that impulsivity and risk-affinity may come together in the same persons
(i.e. ‘‘impulsive risk-takers’’, Burt et al. 2014, p. 457), but they constitute different
behavioral tendencies belonging to different subdimensions of the dual-systems model:
‘‘Impulsivity refers to a lack of self-control or deficiencies in response inhibition; it leads to
hasty, unplanned behavior. Sensation-seeking, in contrast, refers to the tendency to seek
out novel, varied, and highly stimulating experiences, and the willingness to take risks in
order to attain them. Not all impulsivity leads to stimulating or even rewarding experiences
(e.g., impulsively deciding to end a friendship), and not all sensation-seeking is done
impulsively (e.g., purchasing advance tickets to ride a roller coaster or sky dive)’’
(Steinberg et al. 2008, 1765, emphasis and references dropped).
Focusing on the relationship between provocation and violence, low self-control/im-
pulsivity and risk-affinity should increase the likelihood of a violent reaction to provo-
cation for different reasons (Burt and Simons 2013; Felson and Osgood 2008). Self-control
and risk-aversion should therefore constitute different coping resources. As outlined above,
low self-control/impulsivity would increase the likelihood of violence because individuals
are unable to override their aggressive impulses and make rash and unreflected decisions to
react violently. In other words, ‘‘they do things they do not really want to do’’ (Felson and
Osgood 2008, p. 162, emphasis added), or which they might regret afterwards, but they
cannot stop themselves from doing them. The driving force behind self-control as a coping
resource is therefore inhibition. Risk-affinity instead refers to a different aspect of the
decision-making process: risk-seekers find violence and other criminal activities more
rewarding or, at least, they tend to be less anxious about the potential consequences than
risk-averse individuals (Felson and Osgood 2008, p. 165). Risk-affinity could foster violent
reactions to provocation because risk-affine individuals should be less scared to counter-
attack a perceived aggressor, or might even enjoy the thrill of a counterattack. The process
underlying risk-aversion as a coping resource is therefore a matter of differential moti-
vation. While both traits can be expected to be relevant for coping with provocation, self-
control probably has stronger effects, while differences in motivational factors, such as
risk-affinity or fearlessness, should be less important: Felson and Osgood (2008, p. 168)
stated that risk-affinity, or the desire for thrills, ‘‘should provide more of an incentive for
predatory violence than dispute-related violence’’ because ‘‘(p)redatory offenders may
enjoy a certain degree of physical danger or the risk of getting caught by the police. Self-
control may play a greater role in dispute-related violence—these are the crimes of passion
where adversaries lose their temper.’’
Footnote 1 continued
tendency to act on impulse and to neglect long-term costs in decision-making (Hirschi 1995, 2008; Got-
tfredson 2011), which overlaps with definitions of the constructs of impulsivity or trait self-control in the
field of psychology (e.g. Patton et al. 1995; Buss 2012; Tangney et al. 2004).
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Recent versions of GST would also predict that self-control or individual constraint
moderates the impact of strain on delinquency (Agnew 2006; Agnew et al. 2002). How-
ever, Agnew’s conceptualization of self-control or constraint seems to be even broader and
contains yet other ‘elements’ than that introduced by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) and
operationalized by Grasmick et al. (1993). This can easily be seen from the following
quote: ‘‘(I)ndividuals [low in constraint] are impulsive, are risk-taking/sensation-seeking,
reject conventional social norms, and are unconcerned with the feelings or rights of others’’
(Agnew et al. 2002, p. 46).
So far, empirical tests have yielded strongly mixed results with regard to the question
whether self-control serves as a coping resource in the strain-delinquency relationship:
some studies found support for an interaction between self-control and strain in the pre-
diction of delinquency (Moon et al. 2012; Agnew et al. 2002; Hay and Meldrum 2010;
Mazerolle and Maahs 2000; Baron 2009; Turanovic and Pratt 2013), but often studies did
not find consistent evidence for such an effect (Peter et al. 2003; Cheung and Cheung 2010;
Botchkovar et al. 2009; Ellwanger and Pratt 2014; Hay and Evans 2006; Stogner and
Gibson 2010; Jang and Rhodes 2012). One reason might be the widespread use of self-
control measures such as the scale by Grasmick et al. (1993). Previous research has often
shown that the six components of the Grasmick-scale had differential predictive powers
with regard to certain delinquent behaviors (Arneklev et al. 1993; Wood et al. 1993;
Longshore et al. 1996; Piquero and Rosay 1998; Delisi et al. 2003; Bornewasser et al.
2007; Conner et al. 2009; Ward et al. 2014). When self-control is treated as unidimensional
these differential relationships are obscured. However, if the subdimensions are related to
delinquent behaviors for different reasons and have different underlying mechanisms, it
can be expected that the involved traits also differ with regard to their role in the condi-
tioning process. Applied to the question of whether self-control/impulsivity moderates the
provocation-violence link, it should be more difficult to unravel an existing conditioning
effect of self-control if the applied measure combines it with characteristics that are
unrelated to self-control in a narrower sense and its functioning in the coping process (e.g.
with a preference for physical activities or self-centeredness). Furthermore, as explained
above, different personal characteristics, such as impulsivity and risk-affinity (both of
which are subdimensions of the Grasmick-scale) could condition the reaction to strain, but
for different reasons. If both are combined in a composite index, a sound understanding of
the processes or mechanisms involved in the conditioning process, in other words, why
people differ in their reaction to provocation, is made impossible.
In order to better understand why some individuals seem to be more tolerant of the
experience of strain than others and are able to cope in a non-delinquent manner, unidi-
mensional measures with good content validity are vital. It should be noted that this
argument stands in contrast to the recent advice by Agnew (2013) on how to test for factors
conditioning the reaction to strain. Agnew (2013) suggested that researchers should
investigate sets of characteristics ‘‘that together create a strong propensity for criminal
coping’’ (Agnew 2013, p. 653) and criticized research that ‘‘considers each characteristic in
isolation, with other relevant characteristics controlled’’ (Agnew 2013, p. 662). If com-
bining a host of conditioning variables into one scale is not possible, Agnew advised
survey researchers to ‘‘measure the individual’s standing on factors that serve as a ‘marker’
for a host of conditioning variables, with such markers including gang membership, living
on the street, and perhaps designation as a ‘life-course-persistent’ offender’’ (Agnew 2013,
p. 665). Yet, while it may enhance the ability to predict maladaptive coping if the overall
standing on a host of well-known conditioning factors is considered, it does not improve
the understanding of the coping process. Also, up until now, research has failed to identify
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clear and unquestioned conditioning variables which could be summarized as a factor
creating a ‘propensity for criminal coping.’ On the contrary, research on the factors that
condition the effect of strain has so far produced mixed results, at best (Agnew 2013,
p. 658), and empirical evidence increasingly suggests that aggregating potentially distinct
decision tendencies into one overarching construct of ‘criminal propensity’ or ‘low self-
control’ may obscure, rather than clarify, a sound understanding of the processes leading to
criminal behavior (see also Pogarsky 2007, p. 73; Schulz 2014).
The current strategy is, accordingly, to refrain from using a self-control measure which
combines different subdimensions of ‘criminal propensity,’ but instead to apply measures
of two decision-making tendencies which seem to be central to delinquent behavior: low
self-control/impulsivity and risk-affinity. Although the results of the moderator effects of
self-control are strongly mixed, studies that match types of strain to corresponding types of
problem behavior (e.g., victimization to violence) and that capture ‘low self-control’ using
items on impulsivity, sensation-seeking, and/or temper, tend to be more likely to find an
interaction between their measures and strain (Baron 2009; Hay and Meldrum 2010; Jang
and Rhodes 2012; Moon et al. 2012; Turanovic and Pratt 2013). Studies that do not find
consistent evidence of an interaction between self-control and strain tend to use the self-
control scale developed by Grasmick et al. (1993) or similar measures (Botchkovar et al.
2009; Cheung and Cheung 2010; Ellwanger and Pratt 2014), and/or fail to match strain
with corresponding types of delinquency (Botchkovar et al. 2009; Cheung and Cheung
2010; Stogner and Gibson 2010).
Present Study
The current study advances knowledge on whether self-control conditions the reaction to
strain by addressing three problems simultaneously.
1. It builds on previous research that demonstrates that, when predicting delinquent
coping with strain, research benefits from taking into account the nature of the stressor
and the reason behind a certain coping strategy (Felson et al. 2012). This study
therefore analyzes whether self-control enables an individual to keep calm and not
react violently when faced with a type of strain likely to evoke an aggressive response:
interpersonal provocation. It can be expected that the relationship between provocation
and violence is stronger if self-control is low and weaker if self-control is high.
2. This study focuses on self-control as a coping resource, while using an appropriate
measure that adequately captures its underlying mechanism of restraining impulses
and taking long-term costs into account in decision-making. In the presence of anger-
inducing provocation, self-control should enable individuals to suppress their anger
and aggressive impulses and to take into account the long-term costs of aggression and
violence. In the absence of provocation, the effect of low self-control on (dispute-
related forms of) violence and aggression should be considerably weaker. The
conditioning effects of low self-control/impulsivity are contrasted with those of risk-
affinity. It could be expected that risk-affinity also amplifies the relationship between
provocation and violence, but for a different reason than low self-control: risk-affine
individuals should be less anxious to attack a provoking actor or might even enjoy the
thrill of a (counter-)attack. However, self-control should be more important than risk-
aversion in dispute-related violence, as in the case of provocation (Felson and Osgood
2008).
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3. Strains that are subjectively evaluated as high in magnitude should lead to stronger
emotional responses and have a larger impact on crime than objective strains (Agnew
2013, p. 654; Froggio and Agnew 2007). Without strong aggressive impulses, there
should also be no need for self-control as a coping resource. Conditioning effects
should therefore also be more easily revealed when using subjective measures of
provocation rather than objective measures.
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the whole process under study.
Data
Analyses are based on the first wave of data from the project ‘Friendship and Violence in
Adolescence,’ which is a prospective longitudinal study of seventh-graders in five cities in
the Ruhr that started in 2013. The Ruhr, located in Western Germany, is the largest urban
agglomeration of cities in Germany and is characterized by the downturn in coal and steel
production, a high population density, and high levels of unemployment. A large pro-
portion of the population has a foreign background. Apart from special-needs schools and
the schools of the highest type (German ‘Gymnasium’), all schools from the five cities
were asked to participate in the survey with their entire seventh grade. Only five of the 44
schools declined to participate, and 79 % of the seventh-graders at the participating schools
took part in the study (n = 2635). Participation was voluntary for the students and required
parental consent. In order to maximize privacy, interviews were collected as computer-
administered self-interviews (CASI). In order to counteract language and illiteracy prob-
lems, students could also listen to questions and answer options via headphones. Following
data cleaning and the elimination of incomplete or otherwise unusable questionnaires, a
total working sample of 2608 cases was generated (52.6 % boys; average age 13.1 years,
SD = 0.62).
Fig. 1 Causal diagram of processes under study




The questionnaire contained an eight-item measure of subjective sensitivity to provocation
that assesses the amount of frustration felt when encountering provocations of varying
degrees. Respondents were provided with eight short descriptions of situations and asked
whether, and how much, they would get frustrated in this situation. Answer options were 1
(‘That doesn’t bother me’), 2 (‘I am a little annoyed by this’), and 3 (‘That really enrages
me’). The scenarios were selected after extensive cognitive pretesting with youths of
similar age as the target respondents. The situational descriptions were purposely selected
to represent everyday social interactions for youths from this age group. It was ensured that
the encounters described in the selected scenarios varied from rather mild and ambiguous
provocations, such as ‘Someone asks you to take your shoes off the seat on a train’, to
severe slights, such as ‘Someone makes jokes about your family.’ The more items were
answered affirmatively, the greater the sensitivity should be to encounters which might be
considered as a provocation (subjective strain). Also, respondents who state that they
would react with much anger and frustration should subjectively feel provoked more
intensely than respondents who state that they would not be bothered by these experiences
(the item wording and basic descriptives can be found in Table 3 in the Appendix). The
reliability of the overall scale is good, with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.69. Removing any of
the items would lower Cronbach’s alpha. The overall measure of subjective provocation is
computed as the arithmetic mean of the answers to the eight items. For analysis purposes,
the scale was z-standardized.
Readers may note that this scale might resemble some previous approaches to mea-
suring situational or state anger (Capowich et al. 2001; Jang and Johnson 2003; Moon et al.
2009; Broidy 2001). As mentioned above, the complication of separating strain theory’s
core action-guiding construct of anger from strain is partly linked to Agnew’s (2001)
introduction of a subjective or judgmental component to the experience of strain, because
affective states and cognitive judgments of an event or an experience as aversive should
mingle and are hard to separate in real life (Zajonc 1980; Schwarz and Clore 1988). I
perceive the important distinction between measures of situational anger and the present
approach to measure subjective sensitivity to provocation is that the present measurement
assesses the proclivity to get frustrated across different situations which might or might not
be considered as provocations by different actors. Therefore, a person with a high value on
the present measure should get frustrated by very different encounters and therefore
consider more situations as straining, whereas a person with low values sees the majority of
encounters as unproblematic. Situational measures of anger, instead, rather tend to assess
how often a person got angry (after experiencing strain) in a certain reference period or,
when applying scenario techniques, ask for the probable amount of anger felt after pre-
senting only one scenario to the respondent. Accordingly, instead of measuring angry
reactions (which measures of state anger aim at) the present measure focuses on individual
differences in situational determinants of angry reactions (also see Spielberger et al. 1983;
Spielberger et al. 1995 for different facets of anger/hostility measurements). Therefore,
while the present measure of sensitivity to provocation is not the most direct measurement
(i.e., because of the high cognitive burden it was not asked, ‘which of the following
situations would you rate as a provocation?’), the amount of frustration felt in response to
the short situational descriptions should closely mirror their subjective evaluation as
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aversive (for a similar approach to the measurement of subjective strain see Ellwanger and
Pratt 2014). Therefore, the underlying assumption is that, if respondents indicate that they
would not get angry when encountering any of the presented scenarios, they should not feel
provoked either.2
Low Self-Control/Impulsivity and Risk-Affinity
The questionnaire contained five items which can be regarded as indicators of impulsivity
and two items for risk-affinity. Response options ranged from 1 (‘disagree strongly’) to 5
(‘agree strongly’). In order to ensure unidimensional scale constructions, a series of con-
firmatory factor analyses were estimated. The results implied that one of the impulsivity
items should be dropped from further analysis.3 The item wording of the remaining four
items was as follows: ‘I often say things I haven’t thought about enough’; ‘I get bored
easily’; ‘I often act on the spur of the moment without stopping to think’, and ‘Usually I am
able to control myself well.’4 The scale reliability is below values which are generally
regarded as acceptable in psychometric research and psychological testing (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.50). However, it is in the expected range for short scales in survey research
(Diekmann 2010, p. 254).5 The item wording of the two risk-affinity items was ‘Sometimes
I will take a risk just for the fun of it’, and ‘I sometimes find it exciting to do things that
may be dangerous.’ Both items are highly correlated (Pearson’s r = 0.64), yielding a
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.77 when both are combined in a scale. Scales for risk-affinity and
low self-control/impulsivity were constructed by computing the arithmetic mean of the
2 Note that in psychological research, the amount of anger felt is also used as a manipulation check for
experimentally induced levels of provocation (e.g. Denson et al., 2011b).
3 A first model, specifying one common factor for all seven items did not achieve a satisfactory model fit
(v2 = 603.43; df = 14; RMSEA = 0.129; CFI = 0.82; SRMR = 0.073; BIC = 53,165.92). Modification
indices indicated that the model could be improved by allowing for correlated error terms between the items
on impulsivity, as well as between those on risk-affinity, implying that items on each trait share variance
which is not explained by one common factor. A second model with one latent variable for impulsivity and
one for risk-affinity achieved a markedly better model fit (v2 = 284.40; df = 13; RMSEA = 0.091;
CFI = 0.92; SRMR = 0.050; BIC = 52,854.73). Nevertheless, the model fit was still suboptimal. In a next
step, one impulsivity item for which modification indices indicated a substantial error correlation with an
item of the risk affinity dimension was dropped from further analysis. This model achieves a satisfactory
model fit (v2 = 48.85; df = 8; RMSEA = 0.045; CFI = 0.982; SRMR = 0.028; BIC = 45,612.98). Both
risk-affinity items had factor loadings of at least 0.78. All but one of the impulsivity items had factor
loadings of at least 0.49. Closer inspection of this item revealed that it was the only reverse coded item,
formulated in the direction of low impulsivity/high self-control (‘Usually I am able to control myself well’).
Since this item should actually meet the core of self-control, deleting it from the scale would sacrifice better
content validity for a further increase in model fit. It was therefore decided to keep this item in the
impulsivity scale.
4 Items on the tendency to get bored are sometimes included in measures of risk-affinity. Theoretically,
getting bored and distracted easily is a facet of both impulsivity and risk-affinity. Buss (2012, p. 91) stated
that ‘‘impulsive people tend to become bored easily, which is also a characteristic of sensation seekers. This
overlap poses problem for personality researchers, who reasonably prefer neater, sharper distinctions
between traits. However, both impulsives and sensation seekers do become bored easily (…). This is not a
unique case because other personality traits overlap, such as dominance and self-esteem.’’ In the present
case, the item on boredom had high loadings on the impulsivity factor without any indication of a cross
loading on the risk-affinity factor. Therefore, it was decided to keep this item in the impulsivity scale.
Deleting this item from the scale does not substantially alter results. Results are available upon request.
5 Note that keeping the average inter-item correlation of 0.20 constant, Cronbach’s alpha would reach a
value of 0.75 by merely increasing the number of items to 12.
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answers to the respective items. For analysis purposes, both measures were also z-stan-
dardized. The correlation between risk-affinity and impulsivity is 0.39 (p\ 0.001).
Past Violent Behavior
Respondents were asked about the frequency of their involvement in assault within the
previous 12 months. Specifically, they were asked whether they had assaulted with injury
using a weapon, and whether they had assaulted with injury without using a weapon.6
Given that most students did not commit acts of violence, and that those who did com-
mitted very few violent acts, a measure of the prevalence of violence within the past
12 months was constructed. Respondents who reported having committed assault were
coded 1 and those who did not were coded 0. Overall, 17.7 percent of the students reported
having committed an assault within the 12 months before the interview.
Scenario Design and Experimental Manipulations
In order to research the reaction to objective provocations, respondents were also presented
with a scenario describing a situation with the opportunity to react violently. The scenario
was adapted from a scenario used in the Peterborough Adolescent and Young Adult
Development Study (PADS?, see Wikstro¨m et al. 2012). Selected scenario conditions
were experimentally varied across respondents, including the level of provocation by
another scenario character. Male respondents were presented scenarios with male char-
acters, and female respondents with female characters. The following is an example of the
scenarios used:
Katrin (Martin) is waiting for the bus at a bus stop late in the evening. She (he) is
listening to her (his) iPod. Suddenly a girl (boy) who walks by pushes her (him) so
she (he) drops her (his) iPod to the ground and it breaks. Katrin (Martin) asks the girl
(boy): ‘‘Why did you push me?’’ Then the girl (boy) pushes her (him) again. There
are two peers standing nearby, curiously watching the situation. There are two police
officers walking on the other side of the street. Imagine you were Katrin (Martin) and
had been pushed. Would you push or hit the other girl (boy)?
Answer options were on a four-point scale: 0 (‘Yes, very likely’), 1 (‘Probably yes’), 2
(‘Probably no’), and 3 (‘No, very unlikely’). To represent the projected likelihood of acting
violently, answers were reverse coded. Experimental variations were the time of day (late
in the evening/around noon), the presence of third parties (whether there was nobody else
present, police officers nearby, peers nearby, or both nearby), and the intensity of
provocation by the other scenario character. In the low-intensity provocation scenario, the
girl/boy only tells the protagonist to turn down the music. In the moderate-intensity
6 Respondents were asked the following series of questions for assault without using a weapon: ‘Have you
ever hit or kicked someone on purpose resulting in injury (for example, such that he/she bled or had
bruises)? But without using a weapon or some other object. Do not count events in combat sports.’ If
respondents indicated that they did, they were asked ‘Within the past 12 months, have you hit or kicked
someone on purpose resulting in injury?’ Respondents who again indicated that they did, were then asked
about the frequency within the past 12 months. The following questions were asked for assault using a
weapon: ‘Have you ever purposely hurt or tried to hurt someone with an object or a weapon (for example a
chain, a knife or teargas)?’, and ‘Within the past 12 months, have you purposely hurt or tried to hurt
someone with an object or a weapon (for example a chain, a knife or teargas)?’ Respondents indicating
assault with a weapon within the past 12 months were also asked about the frequency within the past
12 months.
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version, the other character pushes the protagonist and ignores the protagonist after being
asked why. In the high-intensity version, the other character pushes the protagonist twice
and the iPod breaks (as in the example above). There were a total of 48 versions of the
scenario (24 experimental variations for each gender). Since the intensity of provocation in
the scenario was experimentally varied across respondents, the projected reaction to it can
be regarded as an adequate assessment of the projected reaction to objective provocation,
the type of strain studied here.
In order to differentiate more clearly between respondents who tend toward violence
and those who do not, the projected violence measure was dichotomized (1 = ‘Yes, very
likely’ and ‘Probably yes’; 0 = ‘No, very unlikely’ and ‘Probably no’). This also allows
for better comparability between the analyses on projected violence and the analyses on the
prevalence of violence within the past 12 months. Two-thirds of respondents (66.7 %)
stated they would not react with violence in the presented scenario, and one-third tended
toward a violent reaction.
Control Variables
The analyses control for gender (1 = male; 0 = female) and age of the respondents. Age is
centered at its mean when entered into the regression analysis.
Analytic Strategy
When analyzing non-normally distributed variables, such as measures of crime and
delinquency, advanced regression techniques for count data or regression techniques for
binary outcomes (e.g., when analyzing the prevalence of offending) are routinely used (but
see Mazerolle and Maahs 2000). However, researchers often overlook the problem that,
when applying regression techniques to non-linear dependent variables such as probit or
logistic regressions, testing for an interaction between two variables to predict the prob-
ability of a certain outcome cannot be evaluated by looking merely at the sign, magnitude,
or statistical significance of the coefficient of an included product term between the
variables assumed to interact. First, non-linear models contain model-inherent interaction
terms, since the effect of a change in any independent variable on the probability of the
dependent variable will depend on the values of all of the other independent variables
included in the model (Nagler 1994; Ai and Norton 2003). Since coefficients from logistic
regression (i.e., logits) are non-linearly related to the predicted probabilities of the
dependent variable—with effects highest at a predicted probability of around 0.5 and
smallest as the predicted probabilities approach 0 and 1—this dependence on the other
variables in the model is present even if the other variables are unrelated to the inde-
pendent variable of interest (Mood 2010). Furthermore, in contrast to linear regression, the
residual variance in logistic regression is fixed; therefore a difference in coefficients
between groups may also result from differences in unobserved variance only (Allison
1999; Auspurg and Hinz 2011). This also pertains to differences between groups within the
same logistic regression model, as is the case in the estimation of interaction effects (Mood
2010). Drawing conclusions about the presence or absence of conditioning effects by
looking only at the size or significance of the coefficient of an included product term
between two variables in a non-linear model may, accordingly, be very misleading.
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The application of a linear probability model (LPM) is an appropriate solution to the
problem of estimating interaction effects when the dependent variable is binary (Mood
2010). The LPM applies the multiple linear regression model to binary dependent vari-
ables, as shown in Eq. (1):
P y ¼ 1jxð Þ ¼ b0 þ b1x1 þ    þ bkxk ð1Þ
The LPM estimates the probability of the outcome y = 1 as a linear function of xk. The
slope coefficient bk measures the predicted change in the probability of y = 1 when xk
increases by one unit, and the intercept b0 is the predicted probability of y = 1 if all xk are
set to zero (Wooldridge 2013). In the case of linear regression, coefficients are easily
comparable across models and groups. The results from the LPM can be directly inter-
preted in terms of probability changes (Mood 2010; Wooldridge 2013), and interaction
effects can easily be studied by including a product term between the measures of interest
in the linear regression equation. However, while the use of LPMs is common in econo-
metrics, they are seldom used in other disciplines (Mood 2010, p. 78). Three general
arguments against their use are pointed out: the possibility of out-of-range predictions,
heteroscedastic error terms, and the misspecified functional form of the underlying model
(see Mood 2010). However, unrealistic predicted values also often occur in linear
regression with non-binary outcomes (e.g., in the case of predicting a negative salary),
which does not necessarily suggest they should not be used on binary outcomes per se.
Also, the misspecification of the functional form can be neglected in certain cases, for
example, when there is no interest in the nonlinearity of the relationship itself or in the
marginal effect of a variable at a certain point of the probability distribution, but in
(differences in) average effect estimates and the sign and significance of relationships
(Mood 2010), as is the case with regard to the current research question. In fact, ‘‘the LPM
effect estimates are unbiased and consistent estimates of a variable’s average effect on
P(y = 1)’’ (Mood 2010, p. 78, emphasis added). Heteroscedasticity seems to be more
important, as it may affect the estimated standard errors. However, Hellevik (2009) showed
in a recent simulation study that linear and logistic significance tests yield almost identical
results, and their p values differ by\0.005 in the clear majority of cases (90 %). Since the
present study focuses on the analysis of conditioning effects, the LPM is used.7 In all
regression models, cluster-robust standard errors account for the possibility that students
from the same class might be more similar to each other than to students from different
classes.
7 A possible alternative would be to use logistic regressions and to compare the average marginal effects
(AMEs) of the independent variables at different levels of the conditioning variable (see e.g. Moon et al.
2012), and to test for significant differences in the AMEs across the separate models (see Auspurg and Hinz
2011). Grouping a continuous measure such as the present measure of low self-control, however, also leads
to a considerable loss of information. Robustness checks demonstrate that for the present research question,
this approach would largely lead to the same conclusions (see Table 4 in the Appendix for the effects of
subjective provocation at different levels of self-control). In order to illustrate the problem of merely
evaluating conditioning effects by including a product term between two variables in logistic regressions, I
also report the results of a logistic regression on the full sample including a product term between low self-
control and subjective provocation.
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Results
A first model regresses the prevalence of violence within the past 12 months on measures
of subjective sensitivity to provocation, low self-control/impulsivity and risk-affinity
(Table 1). Low self-control and risk-affinity each independently increase the probability of
violence, while risk-affinity has stronger effects: while an increase in risk-affinity by one
standard deviation increases the probability of violence by ten percentage points, an
increase by one standard deviation in low self-control/impulsivity increases the probability
of violence by only four percentage points. Subjective sensitivity to provocation has an
effect of similar size as low self-control. The second and third model assess the individual
conditioning effects of low self-control and risk-affinity. Both models produce almost
identical results: Both impulsivity and risk-affinity seem to condition the relationship
between subjective provocation and violence and the estimates of the included interaction
terms are of equal size and significant (p\ 0.01). Model 4 includes both product terms
simultaneously. The results of this model indicate that self-control and risk-affinity each
independently condition the link between provocation and self-control. This implies that
both traits make violent reactions to provocation more likely, but for different reasons.
Furthermore, self-control seems to be a more important coping resource for subjective
provocation, as the effect size of the product term between risk-affinity and sensitivity to
provocation decreases as compared to Model 3, while the interaction effect between
impulsivity and subjective provocation remains constant.
Figure 2 displays both interactions graphically. When self-control is highest, subjective
sensitivity to provocation does not have an effect on the probability of violence. This
implies that individuals with high self-control are able to control their anger and suppress
aggressive impulses when they feel provoked. Furthermore, when subjective sensitivity to
provocation is minimal, low self-control does not increase the probability of violence. This
supports the idea that the effect of low self-control on violence works to a large degree
through the higher probability of reacting violently to provocation, stressing the need for a
Table 1 LPM regressions of
violence within the past 12
months on subjective provoca-
tion: the conditioning effects of
self-control and risk-affinity
* p\ 0.05, ** p\ 0.01;
Standard errors in parentheses

























































Observations 2559 2559 2559 2559
R2 0.155 0.159 0.159 0.161
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situational trigger of a violent reaction of individuals without self-control. Risk-seekers are
also more likely to react violently when they feel provoked, compared to risk-averse
individuals, but differences in the slope of subjective provocation are less pronounced
when compared to differences between individuals with highest and lowest self-control.
Also, risk-affinity seems to have an effect on violence above and beyond the probability of
reacting violently to provocation, as the proclivity for risk still has an effect on violence
when subjective sensitivity to provocation is minimal.
Table 2 shows the results of regressions of the measure of projected violence on
experimentally varied degrees of objective provocation within the presented scenario. All
models control for effects of other scenario conditions (such as the time of day or the
presence of third parties) which are not relevant for the present research question. Model 5
in Table 2 shows that self-control and risk-affinity make projecting a violent reaction in the
presented scenario more likely. Both moderate and high levels of objective provocation by
the scenario character strongly increase the inclination to act violently compared to the
reference category of a low level of provocation. An additional Wald test shows that a high
level of provocation strongly increases the inclination to act violently relative to moderate
provocation (F(1,121) = 88.7; Model 5).
Model 6 tests for interactions between low self-control/impulsivity and experimentally
varied levels of objective provocation. Only the entered product term between low self-
control and a moderate level of objective provocation is significant at conventional levels,

















































Predicted values based on Model 4. Values of covariates: male, average age (13.1 years), average 
risk-affinity (left graph) or average self-control (right graph) 
Fig. 2 Violence within the last 12 months and subjective provocation by levels of self-control and risk-
affinity
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scenario condition than those with high self-control. The interaction between high
objective provocation and low self-control is far from statistical significance. This result
might possibly be attributed to the very high level of provocation in this scenario condition,
since the protagonist in the presented scenario was pushed twice for no reason and his/her
possession was damaged. Overall, 53.1 percent of respondents in this scenario condition
state that they would be inclined to act violently. It may be possible that such a strong
attack by the other scenario character might be a valid justification for a counterattack or
even a ‘call’ for self-defense. In this case, an aggressive response might be less of a failure
of self-control.
Model 7 repeats this analysis with risk-affinity as the moderator of the effects of
objective provocation. The interaction effects between risk-affinity and objective provo-
cation are stronger than those between self-control and objective provocation (Model 6).
Interestingly, an individual’s risk-affinity and fearlessness also further increases his/her
inclination to act violently under the condition of a very high level of provocation. Model 8
includes both the interactions between self-control and objective provocation as well as
Table 2 LPM regressions of projected violence (scenario) on objective provocation: the conditioning
effects of self-control and risk-affinity
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Observations 2564 2564 2564 2564
R2 0.245 0.247 0.249 0.250
* p\ 0.05, ** p\ 0.01; Standard errors in parentheses. Models control for effects of other scenario
conditions
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those between risk-affinity and objective provocation. Figure 3 depicts the interactions
from Model 8 graphically.
The coefficients of the product terms between low self-control and objective provo-
cation decrease, implying that part of the interaction between self-control and objective
provocation (Model 6) was probably due to the correlation between self-control and risk-
affinity or the fact that impulsivity and risk-affinity sometimes come together in the same
people. As a result, the interaction between self-control and moderate provocation is no
longer significant in Model 8. Overall, the present analyses find less evidence for a con-
ditioning effect of low self-control when applying an objective measure of provocation
instead of a subjective measure. This might indicate that a subjective measure of sensitivity
to provocation might be better suited for revealing the actual need for resources for
regulating angry aggressive impulses. The interactions between risk-affinity and objective
levels of provocation remain of similar size and significant when including the product
terms between self-control and objective provocation in the model. The coefficient of the
interaction term between risk-affinity and high objective provocation even increases a little
when controlling for the conditioning effects of self-control, also speaking for the inter-
pretation that risk-affinity and self-control lead to violent reactions for different reasons
and constitute different coping resources. Overall, the pattern of results speaks against the
use of composite measures of ‘criminal propensity’ when trying to understand which
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Predicted values based on Model 8. Values of covariates: male, average age (13.1 years), average 
risk-affinity (left graph) or average self-control (right graph) 
Fig. 3 Projected violence and objective provocation by levels of self-control and risk-affinity
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Discussion
The aim of the present study was to shed light on the question of whether low self-control
conditions the link between strain and delinquency. It did so by addressing three problems
simultaneously. First, instead of applying composite measures of different types of strain
and a composite measure of ‘general delinquency’ without paying attention to the reason or
mechanism underlying delinquent coping, it considered a specific type of strain that is
particularly conducive to violence and matched it with the coping resource that is likely to
be invoked in not responding violently to this type of strain: self-control. Second, drawing
on recent work which suggests that criminological research could benefit from differen-
tiating between the personality traits of risk-affinity and impulsivity (Burt and Simons
2013; Burt et al. 2014; Ksinan et al. 2014; Schulz 2014; Felson and Osgood 2008), this
study contrasted the conditioning effect of low self-control/impulsivity with that of risk-
affinity, while using mechanism-congruent measures for both traits. The conditioning
processes were analyzed using objective and subjective measures of provocation, because
strain that is subjectively perceived as aversive should elicit a stronger need for coping
resources. Analyses were based on a large sample of seventh-graders interviewed in the
classroom setting in five cities in Western Germany. The used measures comprise an
experimental scenario design as well as self-reports of past violent behavior.
The results from the LPMs demonstrate that subjective sensitivity to provocation,
objective provocation, and the personal traits of risk-affinity and low self-control/impul-
sivity each increase the probability of violence. However, they should not merely be
regarded as additive factors increasing the likelihood of aggression, because they work
together in bringing about violent behavior. Both risk-affinity and low self-control further
increase the probability of violent behavior within the past 12 months when individuals
feel easily provoked (subjective provocation). However, self-control seems to be somewhat
more important as a coping resource with respect to subjective provocation. For individuals
with the highest level of self-control, subjective provocation did not have an effect on
violence. Also, the effect of low self-control seems to be mostly due to a greater probability
of reacting with violence when feeling provoked; for individuals with minimal sensitivity
to provocation, low self-control did not increase the probability of violence. The inter-
action effect between self-control and subjective provocation remained significant when
controlling for that between risk-affinity and subjective provocation, supporting the
argument that risk-aversion and self-control both function as coping resources, but for
different reasons. Self-control should enable individuals to control their anger and reflect
on the negative consequences of aggression. Risk-affinity should instead make violent
reactions more likely, because risk-affine individuals would be less anxious about the
negative consequences of violence (such as physical injury or the risk of sanctions) or
might even enjoy the thrill.
The results of a conditioning effect of self-control on the link between objective
provocation and projected violence in the applied vignette were less clear. First, without
controlling for the conditioning effect of risk-affinity, only the interaction between self-
control and a moderate level of provocation was significant. The analysis did not reveal an
interaction effect between high objective provocation and low self-control. The reason for
this is unclear; the fact that the slight in this scenario condition is very strong might have
contributed to this result, as in this case, acting aggressively might be morally justified
(Sykes and Matza 1957) or even necessary for the individual in order to avoid future
victimization (Anderson 2000), and might not mean that individuals are unable to control
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their aggressive impulses. However, the presentation of only three different experimentally
varied degrees of objective provocation did not allow testing for such a ceiling effect.
When simultaneously controlling for the conditioning effects of risk-affinity, those of self-
control were further attenuated and that between self-control and a moderate degree of
objective provocation was no longer significant at conventional levels. Risk-affinity,
however, increased the probability of projecting a violent reaction for both moderate and
high levels of objective provocation, and the interaction effects remained stable and sig-
nificant when controlling for those of self-control. While it was anticipated that condi-
tioning effects are more difficult to reveal when applying an objective measure instead of a
subjective measure of strain, differences between the conditioning factors in this matter
were not expected and deserve closer scrutiny in future research. One possible explanation
could be that the mechanism underlying self-control’s functioning as a coping resource,
namely inhibition of rash impulses, is more sensitive to the personal evaluation of the
respective stressor (in the present case, whether the individual needs to control angry
aggressive impulses or not), while the conditioning effect of fearlessness and risk-affinity,
based on differences in general motivation to violent behavior, is less affected by the
personal evaluation of a stressor. However overall, the results of this study convey that
subjective measures of strain should more often be employed in research on GST, par-
ticularly when analyzing coping resources.
The present study also more generally underlines the importance of using adequate
measures of all underlying processes in theory-guided research and, in the present context,
of focusing on certain types of strain as well as certain types of delinquency when testing
propositions of strain theory (Agnew 2013; Felson et al. 2012). Even if using composite
measures of strain and delinquency in regression analyses might regularly reveal statisti-
cally significant average effects of strain on delinquency and support the general validity of
GST, doing so hampers a deeper understanding of the underlying processes and condi-
tioning factors (Felson et al. 2012). When studying violence, a conditioning process should
be revealed more easily by studying a type of strain that is particularly conducive to
violence, such as interpersonal provocation (Agnew 1990; Anderson and Bushman 2002;
Tedeschi and Felson 1994). Self-control can be expected to condition this link, as it should
enable individuals to control their anger and not turn their aggressive impulses into action
(Denson et al. 2011b; DeWall et al. 2007). When studying income-generating crime, the
effect of financial strain might be conditioned by self-control, because self-control might
affect the likelihood of making use of the benefits promised by a chance to ‘make some
easy money’ via illegitimate means. Individuals’ routine activities (Cohen and Felson
1979) and the settings in which they find themselves, however, might be more proximate
and stronger conditioning factors for the relationship between financial strain and crime.
Equally important is the use of adequate measures for the conditioning factors under study:
low self-control should make delinquent coping more likely because it concerns an indi-
vidual’s tendency to act on impulse and reflect on the long-term negative consequences of
delinquent coping. Risk-affinity should instead make delinquent coping more likely
because risk-affine individuals do not fear the negative consequences of crime or might
even be attracted by its excitement and thrill. As long as measures of coping resources do
not orient towards the mechanism underlying the coping process, it will remain difficult to
reveal conditioning effects and to interpret them correctly if found.
Some limitations of this study should be kept in mind. First, although it is more likely
that subjective provocation and low self-control affect the likelihood of acting violently
than the other way around, the analyses of the prevalence of violence within the last
12 months did not reflect the correct temporal order of low self-control, subjective
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provocation, and violence. Therefore, the present cross-sectional study cannot rule out the
possibility of reversed causality.
Second, it was not possible to directly compare the effects of objective provocation and
subjective sensitivity to provocation as well as the effects of their respective conditioning
factors, since objective provocation and subjective provocation were measured on different
scales. It was plausible to assume a rank ordering between the different categories of
objective provocation (and reflected in the increasing levels of projecting a violent
response), such that our scenario version of a ‘high’ degree of provocation, in which the
scenario character is pushed twice, is considered as more provoking than that of a
‘moderate’ provocation, in which the scenario protagonist is pushed and ignored by the
other scenario character which, in turn, is considered as more severe than the situation in
which the protagonist is told to turn down the music. Nevertheless, the ordered categories
cannot be expected to lie at equal distances from each other on an underlying continuous
latent scale of objective degree of provocation. Applying a measure of objective provo-
cation on interval scale level would allow for directly comparing the effects of subjective
provocation (and their conditioning factors) to those of objective provocation. Further-
more, it would allow testing for flooring or ceiling effects which could possibly play a role
with regard to the conditioning effect of self-control.
Third, the present study did not disentangle the magnitude of subjective strain from the
associated emotional response, but assessed subjective sensitivity to provocation through
the amount of frustration and anger felt in different social encounters. As discussed,
Agnew’s (2001) introduction of a subjective component to the experience of strain makes
separating subjective strain from the associated emotional ‘response’ problematic, because
subjective evaluations of an entity and feelings tend to go hand in hand. Therefore, the
causal ordering of the subjective evaluation of strain and emotions aroused is often unclear
(Zajonc 1980; Schwarz and Clore 1988). The underlying assumption of the present mea-
sure of subjective provocation was that, if a respondent does not get angry across the
different situational descriptions presented, he/she should not be sensitive to provocation
either. However, the emotional reactions to such encounters may be more complex and the
present study was not able to take this into account: individuals may feel provoked and get
angry, but, at the same time, fear the provoking agent too much for a counterattack. Next to
(rather) stable dispositions such as self-control or risk-affinity, situational emotions such as
fear might also inhibit or amplify aggressive responses. Therefore, research should pay
closer attention to the possibility that individuals may have different emotions at the same
time and that such emotions might also moderate the reaction to (subjective or objective)
strain.
The present study focused on a small subset of the universe of strains which might lead
to delinquent behavior and of coping resources which could condition the link between
strain and crime. However, in the end, this case study illustrates that focusing has its
merits: it leads to a better understanding of why individuals cope with strain by engaging in
(a certain type of) delinquency or remain resilient when experiencing strain. Agnew (2013,
p. 653) instead advised survey researchers to investigate sets of characteristics ‘‘that
together create a strong propensity for criminal coping.’’ However, I think that this advice
contradicts his strategy to match ‘‘particular strains and types of crime’’ (Agnew 2013,
p. 656). Instead, certain types of strain should also be matched with ‘certain types of
coping resources.’ Even if, at times, the prediction of delinquent coping might be
improved, one can ask what has really been learnt by finding that the ‘‘designation as a
‘life-course-persistent’ offender’’ (Agnew 2013, p. 656) increases the likelihood of
delinquent coping with strain, or that ‘crime-prone individuals’ tend more towards
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delinquent coping. At the least, the present findings demonstrated that combining several
conditioning factors into one scale, as suggested by Agnew (2013, p. 656), mirroring an
individual’s ‘‘overall standing on those conditioning variables said to increase criminal
coping’’ (Agnew 2013, p. 656) may not always be most informative and, at times, may hide
interesting results.
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Appendix
See Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3 Subjective provocation: item wording
Now think about the following things














Someone badmouths things that are important



























Someone asks you to take your shoes off the



































Someone comes toward you on the sidewalk so










Absolute frequencies, percentages in brackets
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